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CURATIVE STATUTES OF COLORADO RESPECTING
TITLES TO REAL ESTATE
By PERCY S. MORRIS, of the Denver Bar
(Continued from February Issue)

Liens-Extinguishment of. Occasionally there appears
on the abstract a deed of trust or mortgage executed forty or
fifty years prior to the time of examination with no release
thereof or foreclosure thereof shown by the records. No doubt
in many cases this was due to the owner of the property having paid the indebtedness secured by the encumbrance but having omitted to secure and record a release or, having secured
the release, having omitted to record it or to the owner having
conveyed the property to the holder of the encumbrance and
the latter having neglected to have his encumbrance released
of record. It has been held by the Colorado Supreme Court
that no statute of limitations bars foreclosure of a deed of
trust by sale under the power contained therein, but that foreclosure sale under the deed of trust can be made no matter how
long it may be made after the maturity of the indebtedness.
Holmquist vs. Gilbert, 41 Colo. 113; Foote vs. Burr, 41
Colo. 192; Brereton vs. Benedict, 41 Colo. 16; Walters vs.
Webster, 52 Colo. 549; Rowe vs. Mulvane, 25 Colo. App.
502. It has also been held by the Colorado Supreme Court
in Folda Real Estate Co. vs. Jacobsen, 75 Colo. 16, that,
although an action upon a promissory note may be barred by
the statute of limitations, nevertheless an action to foreclose
a mortgage securing such note is not barred by the statute of
limitations. Feeling that there should be some way, other
than by suit, of clearing off these old encumbrances that have
remained of record for forty or fifty years and which apparently have been forgotten long ago by all persons connected
therewith, there was passed in 1927 a number of sections
(1927 Sess. L. 593-598, Secs. 16-28) which in substance
provided that no lien upon real property created by mortgage,
trust deed or other instrument securing the payment of an indebtedness shall remain a lien for a period longer than seven
years after the final payment of principal is due and payable
as shown by the recorded instrument and that such instrument shall cease to be a lien and the record thereof shall cease
to be notice after such seven years unless it be extended and
the lien and notice thereof renewed and continued by the
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recording during such seven years of an instrument signed by
the beneficiary or by the owner of the indebtedness secured,
clearly describing the mortgage, trust deed or other instrument and setting forth the date to which the payment of the
indebtedness has been extended and that, if such extension be
recorded within such seven years, the original instrument creating the lien shall continue and be in full force and effect for
the further period of seven years from the date when the final
payment of principal becomes due and payable as set forth
in said extension, with the right to make similar successive
renewals or extensions of the lien; and such sections further
contained provisions to the effect that instruments creating
liens as security for indebtedness which were of record at the
time the sections went into effect and in which the final payment therein provided was then past due shall, for the purpose
of such sections, be considered as having become due at the
time the sections went into effect and that the time for payment may be extended within seven years thereafter in conformity with the provisions of such sections and, if not so
extended, such instruments shall, seven years after the sections went into effect, cease to constitute notice for any purpose and thereafter purchasers or encumbrancers shall not be
bound thereby. Such sections further provided that if, prior
to the expiration of the period, as defined in such sections,
during which any such instrument creating a lien shall constitute notice, there shall be filed in the office of the Recorder of
the proper county a notice of an action pending to foreclose
such lien or a notice of foreclosure proceedings thereon by a
Public Trustee or other proper official, then the lien created
by such instrument shall not terminate and the notice granted
by the recording thereof shall continue until final disposition
of the action or foreclosure proceeding. Such sections contained other provisions to carry out the general purpose
herein shown. However, evidently feeling that these sections
might, upon the expiration of the period of seven years from
their passage, extinguish encumbrances which were then recognized by the parties as being valid and in full force and
effect and upon which payments of interest and perhaps of
principal were being regularly made, through the owners of
the indebtedness secured by such encumbrances being ignorant
of the fact that they must during such seven years file an ex-
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tension if their encumbrances were not to be extinguished,
and desiring at least to postpone the time when the provisions
of these sections would extinguish encumbrances, the Legislature in 1933 (1933 Sess. L. 798-802) amended the 1927
sections so as to change the words "seven years wherever they
appeared to "fifteen years," thereby postponing from March
28, 1934, to March 28, 1942, the time when the provisions
of the 1927 Act should take effect. As to whether before
March 28, 1942, the Legislature will again extend the time
when the provisions of the Act shall produce the extinguishment of liens, extensions of which shall not have been recorded in compliance with the Act, or will repeal entirely the
provisions of the Act or, on the other hand, will do nothing
and permit the provisions of this Act to take full effect remains to be seen. On the one hand, there is the consideration
that by these provisions many old and forgotten encumbrances, many of which have been paid though not released of
record, will be cleared off of the title to pieces of real estate.
On the other hand, there is danger that encumbrancees may
lose their investments in the encumbrances held by them
through their ignorance of the requirements of the statute,
even though such encumbrances are recognized by the parties
thereto as being valid and in full force and effect clear up to
the time when the extinguishment of these encumbrances
takes effect. The provisions of the 1927 Act as amended by
the 1933 Act are C.S.A. Chap. 40, Secs. 122 to 134.
Limitations-LienBarred when Indebtedness Is Barred.
In the case of Folda Real Estate Co. vs. Jacobsen, 75 Colo.
16, it was held that foreclosure by suit of a mortgage on real
estate is not barred although an action upon the note secured
by such mortgage is barred by the statute of limitations. The
effect of this decision was apparently to enable a mortgage on
real estate to be foreclosed no matter how long a period may
have elapsed after the maturity of the indebtedness secured
thereby and even though there had not been any partial payment, new promise or acknowledgment that would waive the
bar of the statute of limitations as against a suit on the indebtedness. Because of this there was passed in 1927 a statute (1927 Sess. L. 598, Sec. 27; C.S.A. Chap. 40, Sec. 133)
which provides that the lien created by any instrument shall
be extinguished at the same time that the right to commence
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a suit to enforce payment of the indebtedness secured by the
lien is barred by any statute of limitation of this state.
Limitations-May be Asserted Affirmatively. At common law a statute of limitations is a shield and not a sword;
it can at common law be asserted only by way of defense
against an action brought by another and not affirmatively as
basis for an action. However, 1927 Sess. L. 604, Sec. 41,
C.S.A. Chap. 40, Sec. 148, provides that the limitations
"herein provided for" (evidently meaning the limitations
provided in the entire Chapter 150 of the 1927 Session Laws)
may be asserted either affirmatively or by way of defense and
may be used in any action as a source of or as a means to
establish title or the right of possession or as an aid or explanation of title and that actions may be maintained affirmatively to establish the limitations provided in said Chapter
150 of the 1927 Session Laws.
Mechanic's Liens. One of the most perplexing problems of attorneys examining titles has been the situation
where a mechanic's lien claim was filed of record a long time
before the examination and the abstract shows no release of
the lien claim and nothing indicating any suit brought to foreclose it. The statutes have always imposed a limitation within
which to bring the suit to foreclose a mechanic's lien of six
months after the completion of the entire work and under the
decisions, if the suit was not brought within that period, the
lien was lost. However, if the suit had been brought within
that period, then the lien was preserved until the determination of such suit and, if such determination was one which
sustained the lien, then such lien continued thereafter indefinitely. An attorney might check the records in the office of
the Clerk of the County Court and the Clerk of the District
Court of the county wherein the real estate was situated and
might ascertain from same that no suit to foreclose the lien
had been brought in either of said courts; nevertheless the
Supreme Court in Fletcher vs. Stowell, 17 Colo. 94 and Burton vs. Graham, 36 Colo. 199, has held that a suit respecting
real estate may be brought in any county in the state subject
only to the right of a defendant to move for a change of
venue and, if no such motion is made, the court has full jurisdiction; therefore, so far as the examining attorney could
know, a suit might have been brought in any one of the
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sixty-two counties in the state other than the county wherein
the real estate was situated to foreclose the lien and such suit
might still be pending or a judgment sustaining the lien may
have been entered although not followed by any recording of
a certified copy of the judgment or a Sheriff's Certificate of
Purchase or a Sheriff's Deed. To remedy this situation a
statute was passed in 1915 (1915 Sess: L. 333; 1921 Comp.
Laws, Sec. 6451; Original 1935 C.S.A. Chap. 101, Sec. 24)
which provided that, in order to hold the lien, the suit must
not only be commenced within said period of six months but
a notice of Ispendens must be filed within that period in the
office of the Recorder of the county wherein the land involved
is situated. However, in the case of Laverents vs. Craig, 74
Colo. 297, the Supreme Court in effect nullified this provision, holding, because of certain phraseology in the statute
and because of the general nature of Ispendens, that the filing
the uIs pendens was required by the statute only for the
of
"protection
of third parties who might deal with the property in ignorance of the contractor's claim" and that the ts
pendens is "not a necessary prerequisite of a suit where the
action is against the owner of the property, or one primarily
liable for the debt". This left for the title attorney the problem as to how his client could "deal with the property in
ignorance of the contractor's claim" when the abstract showed
a notice of the lien of the contractor. In order to remedy this
situation a statute was passed by the 1937 Session of the
Legislature (1937 Sess. L. 481, Sec. 4; 1938 Supp. C.S.A.
Chap. 101, Sec. 24) changing in various respects the phraseology of the previous statute so as to make it more clear and
explicit and adding the words "as against the owner of the
property or as against one primarily liable for the debt upon
which the lien is based or as against anyone who is neither the
owner of the property nor one primarily liable for such debt."
To extend these provisions to lien claims filed before the passage of the statute, there was at the same time adopted a
section (1937 Sess. L. 482, Sec. 5; 1938 Supp. C.S.A. Chap
101, Sec. 24 (1) ) which provides that no lien statement filed
for record prior to the date when such section took effect shall
"as against the owner of the property or as against one primarily liable for the debt upon which the lien is based or
as against anyone who is neither the owner of the property
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nor one primarily liable for such debt," hold the property
longer than one year after the date when such section took
effect unless an action shall have been commenced prior to the
expiration of said one year to enforce the same and unless also,
prior to the expiration of said one year, there shall have been
filed for record with the Recorder of the county in which the
property is situated either a notice stating that such action has
been commenced or a certified copy of a decree or judgment
enforcing such lien rendered in such action or a certificate of
purchase evidencing the purchase of the property at a sale
thereof made pursuant to the provisions of a decree or judgment rendered in such action or a deed conveying the property
under such a sale.
Mortgages. See Liens-Extinguishment of; and Limitations-Lien Barred when Indebtedness is Barred.
Official Deeds. See Decrees, Judgments and Official
Deeds; and Official Sales.
Official Sales. It sometimes is found that a Sheriff's Certificate of Purchase or a Public Trustee's Certificate of Purchase was recorded and no Sheriff's Deed or Public Trustee's
Deed was ever executed and recorded based upon such sale.
Because of this there were passed in 193 7 two sections (1937
Sess. L. 472-473, Secs. 1 and 2; 1938 Supp. C.S.A., Chap. 40,
Secs. 164 and 164 (1)). Said Section 164 included a new
provision that the deed shall be issued by the Trustee, Sheriff
or other official within nine months from the expiration of the
last period of redemption and not thereafter. Said Sec. 164
(1) provides that, if the person entitled to the deed shall not
apply for the deed within such nine months or if no such deed
be issued to him within such period, all rights under the Certificate of Purchase, including any rights of any lienor who has
redeemed therefrom, shall terminate, and no person shall be
entitled to receive such deed, and the official who made the sale
shall not have the power to execute such deed. Such section
then provides that after such nine months the holder of the
Certificate of Purchase, if no redemption has been made, or
the lienor last redeeming shall have a lien on the property sold
superior and prior to all liens and encumbrances recorded subsequent to the recording of the lien on which the sale was
based, for the amount which would have been necessary to
redeem the property on the last day of the last period of re-
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demption, plus interest thereon and all taxes, insurance premiums and other lawful and proper charges advanced or paid
by such person, and that such lien may be enforced only by an
action commenced in the proper court to foreclose the same in
the manner and method provided by law for the foreclosure
of mortgages, and that such lien shall continue in effect only
for fifteen months from the date when such person became entitled to a deed, and that after the expiration of such fifteen
months, if no action to foreclose such lien has been commenced
and no Is pendens of such action has been filed as provided by
law, then it shall conclusively be presumed that such lien has
been paid and discharged and no release or other acquittance
shall be necessary or required to discharge such lien. Such section further provides that in cases where the property had been
sold before the section took effect and the party entitled to a
deed had not received it he may apply for such deed and receive
it within nine months from the date that said section became
effective and that, if he fails to do so, then he may commence
an action within fifteen months from the date when the section
became effective to foreclose such lien and not thereafter and
that, if no action to foreclose such lien has been commenced and
no uIs pendens of such action has been filed as provided by law
within such fifteen months, then it shall be conclusively presumed that such lien had been paid and discharged and no
release or other acquittance shall be necessary or required to
discharge such lien.
Options to Purchase. Previous to 1927 considerable
difficulty was encountered through the owner of property having given an option to purchase the property, which option
was recorded but no sale and conveyance thereunder was ever
consummated. Such options 'constituted clouds upon the
title because the fact that they were of record gave notice of
possible rights of the optionee and anyone dealing with the
property was put upon the duty of inquiring as to whether the
optionee had, in accordance with its terms, tendered performance and payment and therefor in each such case it was necessary to secure a quit claim deed from the optionee or to quiet
title. To remedy these situations there was in 1927 passed a
section (1927 Sess. L. 591; C.S.A. Chap. 40, Sec. 116)
which provided that recorded instruments of the nature of an
option to purchase affecting title to real property under the
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terms of which possession is not delivered to the purchaser
shall not constitute notice to any person for a period of more
than one year after the time specified therein for the conveyance
of the property and that after the expiration of such period
such instrument shall cease to be notice to any person for any
purpose. Such section further provided that all such instruments which shall have been recorded prior to the time the
section took effect shall constitute notice only for one year from
the time the section goes into effect or for one year from the
time in said instruments specified for performance, whichever
of the two times shall be the later, and thereafter the same shall
cease to be notice to any person for any purpose. Such section
contained the proviso that if, prior to the expiration of said
period, legal notice of the pendency of an action be filed for
record, then such instrument and lis pendens shall continue to
be notice until three months after the final termination or disposition of the suit. It is to be noted that the provisions of this
section relate only to instruments "of the nature of an option
to purchase * * * under the terms of which instruments
possession is not delivered to the purchaser." Therefore, the
provisions of this section do not apply to the customary form
of a contract of sale under the terms of which the purchaser
makes a down payment and thereafter makes periodical payments and during the period of the making of such payments
he is entitled to possession of the property. Particular attention should be given to whether the instrument in question is
of the nature of an option to purchase or is of the nature of a
binding contract for the sale and purchase and to whether, by
the terms of the instrument, possession of the property is delivered to the purchaser.
Public Trustees. See alsb: Decrees, Judgments and Official Deeds; Estates-Foreclosure of Deeds of Trust Against;
Liens-Extinguishment of; Public Trustee's Sales-Place of
Sale; Releases before Maturity; Releases of Trust Deeds-to
Whom Made; Successors in Trust; and Trust Deeds Merely
Liens.
Public Trustee's Sales-Place of Sale. When, a few
years ago, the present City and County Building was built
and occupied and the old Court House was vacated and shortly
thereafter torn down, the situation arose of most deeds of
trust, which had been previously executed, having prescribed

DICTA

that the place of sale thereunder should be either the encumbered premises or the Tremont Street front door of the Court
House, and there was no longer any Tremont Street front door
of a Court House in Denver. This situation was the subject
of some discussion among the attorneys. Accordingly, there
were passed in 1933 four sections (1933 Sess. L. 793-794;
C.S.A. Chap. 40, Secs. 58-61) which made valid sales by
Public Trustees, both those previously made and those made
in the future, where they were or are made at the Bannock
Street main entrance to the new City and County Building in
Denver or at the door, side or entrance of the Court House
which shall have been destroyed or removed or the site thereof
otherwise changed or at the door, side or entrance of any new
Court House or any building or place temporarily serving as
a Court House or at the place specified in the trust deed, even
though the Court House was not there maintained at the time
of the sale or at any door, side or entrance of the new City and
County Building in Denver or at any door, side or entrance of
a new Court House or building or place temporarily used for a
Court House, with provision of a limitation of ninety days
after the sections took effect for the bringing of a suit or proceeding based upon a claim that the sale was held at the place
designated in the trust deed which was no longer at the time of
the sale a Court House, or upon the ground that such sale was
held at a place not designated in the trust deed but which was
then actually a Court House.
Recitals PrimaFacie Evidence. Occasionally in examining a title it is found that there is a defect in the title which
requires, in order to correct it, the perpetuation of testimony
or a declaratory judgment to establish certain facts or a suit to
quiet title and it is found that certain recitals in instruments of
record set out the required facts. In the absence of a statute,
these recitals would not constitute any evidence but would be
self-serving declarations or hearsay. Believing that, where an
instrument in the chain of title to a piece of real estate contains
a recital of certain facts and such instrument has been of record
a long time without anyone bringing any legal proceeding to
challenge the truth of such facts, such recitals should be admissible in evidence as prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts
set forth therein, a statute was passed in 1927 (1927 Sess. L.
589; C.S.A. Chap. 40, Sec. 112) providing that all recitals

DICTA

contained in instruments affecting title to real estate which
have remained or shall have remained of record in the office of
the Recorder of the county where the real property affected is
situated for a period of twenty years shall be accepted and received as prima facie evidence of the facts recited therein, except
as to recitals which are mentioned herein under the heading
"Reference to another Instrument."
Recording a Long Time after Execution of Instrument.
Very often in examining a title an attorney finds that a deed
was not recorded until a long time after its execution. In
1928 the Supreme Court in its decision in Larison v. Taylor,
83 Colo. 430, at page 442, said: "There is no presumption
of the delivery of a deed where it is not recorded until long
after its date." This immediately placed a serious question
upon the validity of any deed which had not been recorded
until long after its date. It also, in connection therewith, imposed upon examining attorneys the responsibility of passing
upon the question of what period would constitute "long
after its date," which to the writer is very much like the question "How long is a piece of string?" and also the question of
whether, assuming that the deed had not been recorded until
long after its date, the defect occasioned thereby would be corrected by any lapse of time after it was recorded and, if so, how
long a lapse of time is required. This decision was probably
the cause of attorneys receiving more money in fees for bringing suits to quiet title than any other event in the history of
the Colorado Bar. To remedy this situation there was passed
by the 1937 Legislature an amendment to Section 107, Chapter 40, C.S.A., which was the section prescribing the form of
acknowledgment and the effect thereof. Such amendment
(which is 1937 Sess. L. 447; 1938 Supp. to C.S.A., Chap.
40, Sec. 107) reenacted the previous statute except that at the
end of the last paragraph of the section it added the following
language: "irrespective of the length of time that may have
elapsed between the date of such instrument and the date when
such instrument was recorded. The provisions hereof shall
relate and apply to all instruments which shall have been executed prior to the time when this section takes effect, and irrespective of whether such instruments were recorded before or
after the time when this section takes effect." However, in
the section as it was prepared and handed in for introduction
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in the Legislature the last sentence read: "The provisions
hereof shall relate and apply to all instruments which shall
have been executed prior to the time when this section takes
effect, as well as to all instruments which are executed after the
time when this section takes effect, irrespectiveof whether such
instruments shall have been acknowledged before or after the
time when this section takes effect and irrespective of whether
such instruments are recorded before or after the time when
this section takes effect." However, in the process of going
through both Houses of the Legislature with the numerous
times it was copied, some clerk apparently, in copying the section at some step of the proceedings, omitted the part which
is set out in italics in the foregoing quotation, thereby leaving
out all reference to instruments which are executed after the
time when the section takes effect and leaving the express language of the section as finally signed by the Governor applying
only to instruments executed prior to the time when the section
took effect. A bill has been introduced in the present session
of the Legislature to amend this section so as to include therein
the words that were so omitted.
Reference to Another Instrument. Previous to 1927 attorneys had a great deal of trouble through recorded instruments in the chain of title containing a reference to some other
instrument which either was not of record or, if of record, was
not correctly described in the reference. This trouble arose
most frequently through incorrect description of an encumbrance of record; for example, a deed of record might contain
a provision that it was "subject to a mortgage of $2,000.00."
In such case there might be of record no mortgage securing
$2,000.00 but there might be of record a deed of trust securing
$2,000.00 or an encumbrance, either trust deed or mortgage,
which originally secured $2,500.00 which amount had at the
time the deed was executed been reduced to $2,000.00. The
attorneys felt that there was serious danger of it being held
that a deed of trust was not a "mortgage" or that, in view of
the difference in the amount of the encumbrance mentioned in
the deed and the amount of the encumbrance of record, it
might be claimed that the one did not refer to the other, with
the result that the recital in the deed might be taken to refer
to an instrument which had not been recorded and put everyone dealing with the property on notice that there was an
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unrecorded "mortgage of $2,000.00." And it was felt that
in other cases the reference in an instrument to some other instrument, where the latter was not of record, would put each
person dealing with the property upon notice of the existence
of such unrecorded instrument, with the duty of pursuing an
investigation to ascertain the terms of such unrecorded instrument, with the consequent clouding of the title. To remedy
this situation there was passed in 1927 a section (1927 Sess.
L. 589; C.S.A. Chap. 40, Sec. 113) providing that, when an
instrument affecting title to real estate shall have been recorded
and contains a recitation of or reference to some other instrument purporting to affect title to said property, such recitation
or reference shall bind only the parties to the instrument and
shall not be notice to any other person whatsoever, unless the
instrument mentioned or referred to in the recital be of record
in the county where the property is situated and, unless it is so
recorded, no one other than the parties to the instrument shall
be required to make any inquiry or investigation concerning
such recitation or reference and that, as to recitations or references contained in instruments recorded prior to the time when
the statute took effect, the same shall, after the expiration of
one year from the date when the statute took effect, cease to be
notice unless the instrument referred to in the reservation, exception or reference be actually recorded within said one-year
period.
Releases before Maturity. In the old days many attorneys questioned whether the fact that a release was executed
before the maturity of the indebtedness secured by a trust deed
did not put any subsequent purchaser or encumbrancee upon
inquiry as to whether the note secured by the trust deed was
owned by the original payee at the time of the release or, if it
had been transferred to someone else before maturity, as to
whether the then owner of the note had requested the execution of the release. Accordingly, in 1893 there was passed a
section (C.S.A. Chap. 40, Sec. 83) providing that the recital
in any release or partial release of a deed of trust of the payment or partial payment of the indebtedness secured by such
trust deed shall, as to subsequent purchasers or encumbrancees
of the property mentioned in the release, be evidence of such
payment so as to give full effect to such release when such release was executed before maturity of said indebtedness, if the
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release was duly and legally executed by the proper trustee
according to the purport thereof, to the same extent and with
the same force as the release of any trust deed when executed
after the maturity of the indebtedness.
Releases of Trust Deeds-To Whom Made. Until recent years it had been uniformly held by the Supreme Court
that, although a mortgage constituted only a lien, a deed of
trust with power of sale conveyed to the trustee the legal title
to the property. See decisions cited under the heading "Trust
Deeds Merely Liens" herein. Therefore, in a case where the
maker of the deed of trust afterwards conveyed the property
by quit claim deed and the subsequent release with its usual
words of conveyance of title, as well as of release, was made to
the person who had executed the deed of trust instead of to
the then owner, such release conveyed to the original owner
the naked legal title to the property, leaving his grantee owning only an equitable title. Because of this, very often in cases
of this kind examining attorneys required quit claim deeds
from the original owners. Because of this situation there was
adopted in 1893 Sec. 84, Chap. 40, C.S.A., which provides
that all releases of deeds of trust theretofore or thereafter made
shall be good and valid as to the recitals therein, whether made
to the original maker of said deed or to a subsequent purchaser
of the premises in such release described, and there was adopted
in 1927 a section (1927 Sess. L. 593; C.S.A. Chap. 40, Sec.
120) providing that all instruments executed for the purpose
of releasing any lien or encumbrance against real property shall
be considered only as discharging and cancelling such lien or
encumbrance and that no such release shall convey to any person except the record owner of the property any right, title or
interest in the property and that words of conveyance used in
any such release shall be construed only as in such section
provided.
Representatives. See Executors and AdministratorsConveyances by; Signatures of Those Acting in Representative Capacity; and Trustees.
Seals. Under the common law a seal was required on
every instrument conveying or encumbering real estate. No
practical purpose is under present-day practice served by the
requirement that a seal be so affixed and it very often is found
that an instrument affecting the title to real estate was executed
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and recorded which did not contain near the signature the
word "Seal" or any other form of seal and it was quite uncomfortable to an examining attorney to have to turn down the
title because of the omission of this formality. Accordingly,
in 1917 there was adopted a statute ( 1917 Sess. L. 161, Sec.
5; C.S.A. Chap. 40, Sec.15) providing that it shall not be
necessary to the proper execution of any conveyance affecting
real property that the same shall be executed under the seal
of the grantor nor that any seal or scroll or other mark be set
opposite the name of the grantor.
Sheriffs' Deeds. See Decrees, Judgments and Official
Deeds; and Official Sales.
Signatures of Those Acting in Representative Capacity.
It often happens that a person holding an interest in or lien on
real estate in an official or representative capacity omits to place
following or below his signature to the instrument his official
or representative designation, such as "President," "Trustee,"
etc. Formerly this happened frequently in the execution by a
private trustee of a release of a deed of trust through his omitting to place the word "Trustee" after his signature. To
correct this, 1927 Sess. L. 605, Sec. 45; C.S.A. Chap. 40, Sec.
152, provides that, where from the body of an instrument it
is apparent that a person is conveying or is acting in some official or representative capacity and the signature to the instrument omits the statement of the official or representative capacity it shall be presumed that the official or representative capacity is a part of the signature.
Successors in Trust. Prior to 1894, when the Public
Trustee Act was passed, deeds of trust were executed to private
trustees. They usually named a successor in trust, in the case
of death, refusal or inability to serve, removal, absence, etc.,
someone else, either a named individual or a designated public
official. And even since the passage of the Public Trustee Act
the same practice has been followed with respect to trust deeds
to private trustees. In cases, particularly under old deeds of
trust, where no public official was so designated as successor
and both the private- trustee and the person named as successor
died or moved away or was absent or refused or was unable to
act and a release of the deed of trust or a foreclosure sale under
it was desired, there was no one who could legally execute the
release or make the sale. Because of this situation there was
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passed in 1915 a statute (1915 Sess. L. 478-479; C.S.A.
Chap. 40, Secs. 62 and 63) which provided that under the
circumstances above mentioned the Public Trustee of the
county in which the property involved is located should accept
and discharge the duties of trustee or successor in trust under
such trust deed at the request of any person interested in the
property conveyed by it or the debt secured thereby upon satisfactory proof of the death, absence, refusal or inability to act
of both the trustee and the successor in trust named in the trust
deed; with the further provision that he shall recite the fact of
such death, absence, inability or refusal to act in his trustee's
deed or deed of release; and with the express provision that the
section should not apply to continuing offices or officers named
as trustees or successors in trust. And by 1927 Sess. L. 606,
Sec. 48; C.S.A. Chap. 40, Sec. 155, it is provided that, upon
the death of a sole trustee or the surviving trustee of an express
trust created by any written instrument affecting title to real
property, the trust shall not descend to the heirs of such trustee nor pass to his personal representative, but that the trust,
if then unexecuted, shall vest in the then Public Trustee and
his successors in office of the county wherein the real estate is
situate, with all the powers of the original trustee, except that,
in cases where by law or by the instrument a successor in trust is
provided, the trust shall vest in such successor; with the proviso that the District Court may upon application of any party
in interest appoint a new trustee.
Trust Deeds Merely Liens. Until 1934, when the Supreme Court used language to the contrary (Wright vs. Halley, 95 Colo. 148, 151-152; Tolland Co. vs. First State Bank
of Keenesburg, 95 Colo. 321, 324-325), the Supreme Court
had held in numerous cases that deeds of trust (meaning deeds
of trust to private trustees executed before the passage of the
Public Trustee Act in 1894 and deeds of trust to the Public
Trustee executed thereafter) did not merely create liens but
constituted conveyances of the legal title to real estate. Stephens vs. Clay, 17 Colo. 489, 491; Reid vs. Sullivan, 20
Colo. 498, 502; Belmont Mining Z4 Milling Co. vs. Costigan,
21 Colo. 471,479; Holmquist vs. Gilbert, 41 Colo. 113, 118;
Foot vs. Burr, 41 Colo. 192, 198; Bankers Building Z4 Loan
Association vs. Fleming Brothers Lumber Co., 83 Colo. 335,
338. Some of the complications resulting from these holdings
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are mentioned under the heading "Releases of Trust DeedsTo Whom Made" herein. It was felt that there should be no
more reason for a deed of trust to be deemed to constitute a
conveyance of the legal title any more than for a mortgage to
do so and that the intention of the parties to a deed of trust is
merely to create a lien to secure an indebtedness. Accordingly
there was passed in 1927 a statute ( 1927 Sess. L. 592, Sec. 12;
C.S.A. Chap. 40, Sec. 118) providing that mortgages, trust
deeds or other instruments intended to secure the payment of
an obligation affecting title to or an interest in real property
shall not be deemed a conveyance, regardless of their terms, so
as to enable the owner of the obligation secured to recover possession of real property without foreclosure and sale, but the
same shall be deemed a lien.
Trustees. Very often there appears in the chain of title
a deed to a certain person followed by the word "Trustee."
Under the decisions this placed everyone dealing with the
property upon notice that the grantee acquired and held the
title only in a fiduciary capacity and put anyone dealing with
the property upon inquiry as to who were the beneficiaries and
the terms of the trust. Very often the grantee did not in reality hold the property in a fiduciary capacity, but acquired it
for himself alone and for reasons of his own had the word
"Trustee" added to his name. And, even where the grantee
did acquire the property in a fiduciary capacity, in a large number of the cases there was no way of placing upon the records
in a satisfactory form evidence as to who were the beneficiaries
and the terms of the trust, especially where the grantee acquired
it for the benefit of others (including often associates of his in
the enterprise) who were not named in the deed and there was
no written instrument ever executed by the parties evidencing
the arrangement or naming the beneficiaries or the terms of the
arrangement. In such cases there was no way of making the
title good except by a suit to quiet title. To correct this, in
1921 there was passed a statute (1921 Sess. L. 187, Secs. 1
and 2; C.S.A. Chap. 40, Secs. 9 and 10) which provided that
all instruments conveying real estate or interests therein in
which the grantee is described as Trustee, Agent, Executor,
etc., or in any other representative capacity, shall name the
beneficiary or beneficiaries so represented and define the trust or
other agreement under which the grantee is acting or refer by

DICTA

proper description to book, page, etc., to an instrument of
public record in the county in which the land is located in
which such matters shall appear and that otherwise the description of a grantee in any such representative capacity in
such conveyance shall be considered and held a description of
the person only and shall not be notice of a trust or other representative capacity of such grantee; with the further provision
in the second section that, unless within five years after the
sections became effective, there was filed for record in such
county, so that such record shall appear in the chain of title to
the land, a statement duly verified setting forth the name of
the beneficiary or beneficiaries and defining the terms of the
trust or other agreement establishing the representative relationship or referring by proper description to an instrument of
public record in such county in which such matters shall appear, then, at the expiration of such five years, instruments of
the kind mentioned in the preceding section, which shall have
been executed prior to the time such sections became effective,
shall cease to be notice of such trust or representative capacity
of the grantee and shall be considered and held to be a description of the person of the grantee only.
Unrecorded Instruments - Against Whom Invalid.
Prior to 1927 the statute (1921 Comp. Laws, Sec. 4902)
provided that instruments affecting title to real estate from and
after the filing thereof for record, and not before, shall take
effect "as to subsequent bona fide purchasers and incumbrancers by mortgage, judgment or otherwise not having notice
thereof." It was held in Carroll vs. Kit Carson Land Company, 24 Colo. App. 217, and Brackett vs. McClure, 24 Colo.
App. 524, that, where there are two chains of alleged title to
a piece of real estate, such as the fee simple title deraigned from
the United States and a tax title, those acquiring claims under
one chain are not "bona fide purchasers and incumbrancers" as
against those claiming under the other chain under such statute
and that therefore one claiming title under one of the chains
cannot take any advantage under such statute of the failure of
one claiming title under the other chain to record the instrument through which he claims such title. These decisions were
based upon previous holdings of the Appellate Courts of
Colorado cited in the first of these cases that: "A deed duly
recorded is constructive notice of its existence, and of its con-
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tents, to all persons claiming what is thereby conveyed under
the same grantor by subsequent purchase or mortgage, but not
to other persons.

* * * Such record is constructive notice

only to those who are bound to search for it as subsequent purchasers and mortgagees, and all others who deal with it on the
credit of the title in the line of which the recorded deed belongs." In the two decisions of the Court of Appeals which
have been cited it was held that a decree in a suit to quiet title
in favor of the holder of the tax title does not affect one holding the title deraigned from the United States whose conveyance was not recorded and who had not been made a party to
the suit. And in the Carroll case it was further held that the
provisions of Section 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to its pendens do not apply as against one claiming under a
different chain of title than the chain under which the party filing the Is pendens claims. The effect of these decisions was to
prevent a.decree purporting to quiet a tax title from making a
merchantable title because, although everyone who, according
to the records, owned any interest in or lien upon the original
title was made a party, nevertheless it might afterward develop
that a deed conveying the original title or an encumbrance
upon the original title had been executed and not recorded and
in such case the decree would be ineffective as to the grantee or
encumbrancee under the unrecorded instrument. As the result
there were passed in 1927 two sections (1927 Sess. L. 590,
Secs. 8 and 9; C.S.A. Chap. 40, Secs. 114, 115). The first
of these sections provides that all instruments affecting title to
real property may be recorded in the office of the Recorder of
the county where such real property is situated and that no
such instrument shall be valid as against any class of persons
with any kind of rights, except between the parties thereto,
and such as have notice thereof, until the same shall be deposited with such Recorder. The second of these sections provides
that the filing of notice of pendency of an action in compliance
with law shall from the time of the filing thereof be notice to
all persons who may subsequently acquire any right, title, interest or estate in and to the real property described in such notice from any grantor or from any source whatsoever. Said
Section 8 (Section 114 of C.S.A.) was before the Colorado
Supreme Court for consideration in Moore vs. ChalmersGalloway Livestock Company, 90 Colo. 548, and its validity,
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constitutionality and applicability were sustained by the court
in that case as against one claiming under a different chain of
title whose conveyance was executed eight years before the
passage of the new statute and was not recorded during such
eight years or during the period of almost two years after the
passage of the new statute.
Use Restrictions. See Building and Use Restrictions.
Wills-Powers of Sale under. In the absence of a statute
to the contrary, a power of sale of real estate conferred by will
upon an executor cannot be exercised by an administrator with
the will annexed unless by the terms of the will the sale of the
real estate is mandatory and not discretionary. Because of
this there was passed, as a part of the revision made in 1903
of the statutes relating to administration of estates, a section
(1903 Sess. L. 504, Sec. 91; 1908 Rev. Stat. Sec. 7167) providing that whenever any testator shall by his last will direct
that his real estate or any of it be sold or otherwise disposed of
for the payment of his debts or for any other purpose, and no
executor be named therein or if the executor named therein
refuse such office or be removed or die, the administrator with
the will annexed or de bonis non may sell, convey and dispose
of such real estate in accordance with the provisions of such
will in the same manner and with like effect as the executor
in such will and duly qualified might have done. It will be
noted that in the early part of this section appeared the words,
"shall, by his last will, direct that his real estate, or any of it,
be sold or otherwise disposed of." Because of this titles were
very often objected to because the will did not direct the sale
of the real estate in question but merely authorized the sale of
the real estate by the executor. Because of this the section was
amended (1921 Sess. L. 821; C.S.A. Chap. 176, Sec. 156) so
as to change the words hereinbefore quoted to "shall, by his
last will, confer power for the sale of his real estate, or any of
it, or for its disposition otherwise."
"IMPORTANCE OF IRISH AND SCOTCH"
"I do not suppose that there ever were two peoples, who, considering
how small were their numbers, have made a greater noise in the world
than the Irish and Scotch."---James Bryce, to Society of Pennsylvania,

February, 1909.
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COLORADO LEGISLATURE GRANTS SUPREME
COURT RULE-MAKING POWER
FOLLOWING a precedent established in many states

within the past few years, and recently adopted by the
federal government, the Colorado legislature in the present session passed an act which authorized the state Supreme
Court to prescribe by rule procedure in civil actions in courts
of record. The act was approved by Governor Ralph Carr on
February 25, 1939, and became effective immediately upon
approval by the Governor.
The bill, which originated in the state senate as Senate
Bill No. 119, was sponsored by Senators Ralph Cummings,
Robert Bosworth, Leo J. Crowley, Joseph Constantine, and
Donald Gilliam. The purpose of the bill is similar to one
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enacted by New Mexico, which was one of the pioneers in this
region in this type of legislation.
Under the New Mexico act (Session Laws '33, Chap.
84), which was approved March 13, 1933, the Supreme
Court of that state promulgated rules of pleading, practice and
procedure which greatly simplified and modernized the work
of the trial and appellate courts in both the civil and criminal
divisions. Upon the promulgation of these rules, the New
Mexico Supreme Court stated: "The recent enlargement of
the rule-making power is a clear call upon bench and bar to
cure defects in procedure thought to delay or thwart justice.
While the responsibility is nominally on the Supreme Court,
its failure measurably to meet the public expectation of benefit
will be the failure of the legal profession. * * * The accompanying rules are but the first exercise of a continuing power."
Since the passage of the New Mexico act, the federal congress passed an act (48 Stat. 1064, 28 U. S. C. A. 723b, c)
which permitted the United States Supreme Court to prescribe
rules in civil actions. As a result of this authorization, that
court adopted "Rules of Civil Procedure for the District
Courts of the United States" on December 20, 1937, after a
committee had made an exhaustive study of suggested reforms.
The Colorado act follows rather closely the legislation
passed by the national government, and limits the rule-making
power to civil procedure. The Colorado legislation follows.
Section 1. The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado
shall have the power to prescribe, by general rules, for the
courts of record in the State of Colorado the practice and procedure in civil actions and all forms in connection therewith,
provided, that no rule shall be made by the Supreme Court permitting or allowing trial judges to comment on the evidence
given on the trial. Such rules shall neither abridge, enlarge,
nor modify the substantive rights of any litigants. Such rules
shall take effect three months after their promulgation, and
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thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further
force nor effect.
Section 2. The General Assembly finds, determines, and
declares this act to be necessary for the immediate preservation
of the public peace, health and safety.
Section 3. In the opinion of the General Assembly an
emergency exists; therefore, this act shall take effect and be in
force from and after its passage.

THE COLORADO JUNIOR BAR CONFERENCE
By MARK H. HARRINGTON, Chairman*
N 1934, at the convention of the American Bar Association
held at Milwaukee, an additional section of the association
was created, known as the Junior Bar Conference. It has
been the only section of the association which has not been
based on some branch of the substantive law. It is the only
national organization created by, run by and composed of
lawyers under thirty-six years of age. It was intended that
the conference should develop a closer relationship between the
younger lawyers and the leaders of the profession, and give to
the younger lawyer an opportunity to make his voice heard on
the problems which confront the bar. Since its creation, its
membership has grown extremely rapidly, and is now reported
to exceed six thousand members.
As a result of the creation of this organization, junior bar
groups were formed in numerous communities. It became
apparent that the effectiveness of such groups depended upon
a national body which could coordinate and unify the efforts
of these scattered groups and constitute a national organization exclusively for young lawyers. The activities of the conference have been carried into every state of the Union. When
*This is the first in a series of articles dealing with the form of organization, program, and general activities of the Colorado Junior Bar Conference.
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an attempt was made to have the younger lawyers of this state
participate in these activities, it was realized that an organization of the younger members of the bar of Colorado was
needed. Consequently, the Colorado Junior Bar Conference
was formally organized in Colorado Springs on September
10, 1938, during the annual meeting of The Colorado Bar
Association.
The state group was organized as a unit of the Junior
Bar Conference of the American Bar Association so that it
might, by affiliation with that body, have direct contact with
similar groups throughout the United States and enjoy the
advantages of the activities of the Junior Bar Conference. The
by-laws of the conference provide for rendering assistance in
carrying out the program, not only of the national association
but also of the state association, and in organizing the state
group, complete cooperation has been given by the officers of
The Colorado Bar Association.
As a result of the action which was taken last fall, Colorado for the first time has an organization composed of the
younger members of the bar who have banded together to aid
and assist each other to improve the general relationship between the bar and the public, and so that those fields of activity
which particularly affect the well being and the professional
careers of young attorneys shall hereafter receive their united
and organized attention. There are no dues in either the Colorado Junior Bar Conference or in the national conference. The
only prerequisite for membership in either conference is membership in the American Bar Association and being within the
age limit.
The conference in Colorado had an auspicious beginning.
Its organization meeting was attended by Ronald J. Foulis of
St. Louis, Missouri, the national chairman of the Junior Bar
Conference of the American Bar Association, and by A. Pratt
Kesler of Salt Lake City, the representative of the tenth circuit
on the executive council of that body. Both of these officers
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appeared on the program of The Colorado Bar Association.
The precedent established at Colorado Springs is expected to
be continued so that the conference in Colorado will hold its
annual meeting hereafter at the same time and place as the state
bar convention.
In order, however, to enable the young attorneys of the
state to maintain a closer contact, the by-laws provide for additional meetings during the year. One such meeting has already
been held at Greeley, and it is expected that a further meeting
will be held at Pueblo, which the young attorneys in the southern part of the state may attend.
The officers of the conference are anxious that the form
of the organization, the character of the committees and the
scope of the program which will be attempted by the committees, be made known to every young attorney in the state.
through the cooperation of DICTA, it is expected that subsequent articles will appear in this magazine which will contain
this information.
It is hoped that the Colorado Junior Bar Conference will
result in a cordial relationship between younger members of
the bar throughout the state and the country at large, in an
opportunity to participate actively in bar association activities
both state and national, in a medium for affirmative action
through which young lawyers may do their part in solving
the problems of the profession and of our legal system, and in
the strengthening of the national and state bar associations. A
cordial invitation is extended to every eligible attorney in
Colorado to become affiliated with the Colorado Junior Bar
Conference and participate actively in its affairs.

LEGAL INSTITUTES IN COLORADO
By WILLIAM R. KELLY*

L

EGAL institutes are a solution of the desire for advanced
legal education in average communities. The response
they are receiving shows they fill a long-felt demand.
The American Bar Association first sponsored legal institutes
and encouraged their growth in large centers especially after
the marked success which greeted them in Cleveland and some
other larger cities.
As originally planned, these institutes called for the services of largely eminent authorities, but their expense was
beyond the means of the average community. Such an institute was a real success in Denver a year ago when Professor W.
Barton Leach of Harvard was obtained for the three sessions
on the drafting of wills and trusts which evoked problems in
future interests. To extend the same activity into communities of average lawyers, Burt J. Thompson, chairman of the
sub-committee on Organization and Development of Advanced Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar of the
American Bar Association, developed in Iowa a technique
which has been highly satisfactory.
It must not take too much time. It must present information to the average lawyer on questions that are to come up
frequently in his own actual practice. It must not be too
expensive. It must bring together the lawyers of a particular
district, judicial or even larger according to density of population. In Iowa, it is being done by judicial districts. In
Colorado, the start is being made by organizing these institutes
on a basis of river valleys. The South Platte Valley had its
institute February 4, in Greeley. The Arkansas Valley had a
successful institute on March 10, at Pueblo; and the San Luis
Valley had its institute on March 13, at Alamosa. The Colorado River Valley lawyers are expected to have an institute
also in March or April.
*Chairman of the Committee to Develop Legal Institutes in Colorado.

95

DICTA

At a meeting of the El Paso County Bar Association at
Colorado Springs, Friday evening, February 24th, a proposal
to hold an institute in that city in the near future was discussed
and received the unanimous approval of all those present.
Leon H. Snyder, Esq., was appointed chairman of a committee to arrange the program and entertainment. It is planned
to make the institute one of outstanding interest and held at a
time convenient to all lawyers in the Fourth Judicial District
and others who might attend. Additional information concerning this institute will be published as soon as plans are
completed.
The point is not to take too much of a lawyer's time.
Under the program adopted in Colorado, all of the institutes
have begun in the middle of the afternoon and ended promptly
by 9:00 o'clock the same evening, including a dinner and a
social hour as an interlude. Thus any lawyer coming even 100
miles may leave his office at noon, attend the entire institute,
and return to his home before midnight. In fact, some came
over 100 miles to the South Platte Valley institute at Greeley,
and those held in Pueblo and Alamosa.
Lawyers who are leaders in the bar and authorities on
particular subjects have been willing to cooperate by speaking
on designated topics. Papers, tables on which to write, and
outlines of the lectures were furnished at Greeley and Pueblo,
and the lawyers, by the notes they took and the continued fire
of questions that followed, showed that they want these
chances to learn what is of practical value in their actual law
practice.
A registration fee of $1.00 pays for a satisfactory dinner
and furnishes about twenty-five cents toward the postage and
other secretarial expense incident. The state bar association,
which is sponsoring these institutes in Colorado under the
committee appointed by President G. Dexter Blount, receives
no financial return from the institute and does not contribute
to their cost.
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Legal institutes serve not only as a means of bringing
advanced legal education to the smaller local bars. They furnish what is possibly of equal value-a means of getting the
lawyers together for a meeting, not too long, where acquaintance will be retained and matters of interest to lawyers are
naturally discussed. With every other activity in the country
meeting more frequently than lawyers are, members of the bar
feel it is high time to begin to be more active within their professional organizations.
"DAT DAM SURE FIX OSCAR"
Not long ago in Anderson County, Texas, the will of one Herman
Obleweiss was probated. It seems to us that the suspicious Herman
unintentionally wrote a pretty revealing character sketch of himself, towit:
"i am writing of my will minselluf dot dam lawyer vont he
should have too much money, he ask too many answers about family.
first ting i vant i dont vant my brother oscar get a dam ting vot i got.
he is a mumser he done me out of $40 14 years since.
"i vant hilda my sister she gets der north 60 akers of at vere i am
homing it now i bet she dont get dot loafer husban of hers to broke.
20 akers next plowing time gonoph york. she cant have it if she lets
oscar live on it i vant i should have it back if she does.
"tell momma dot $600 she has been looking for for 20 years is
berried from der backhouse behind about ten feet down she better let
little frederick do der digging and count it yen he comes up.
"pastor lucknitz can have $300 if he kiss de book he vont preach
no more dumhead talks about politiks. he should a roof put on der
medinghouse mit and der elders should der bills look at.
"momma the rest should get but i vant it dot adolph should tell
her vot not she do so no more slick irishers sell her vakum cleaners
dey noise like hell und a broom dont cost so much.
"i want it dot mine brother adolph should be my execter und i
vant it dot der jedge should pleez made adolph plenty bond put up und
watch him like hell adolphus is a good bisness man but only a dumkoph
vould trust him mit a busted pfennig.
"i want dem sure dot schlienical oscar dont nothing get tell adolph
he can have $100 if he prove it to jedge oscar dont get nutting. dat
dam sure fix oscar."
YATES A. LAND, of the Denver Bar.

II Supreme Court Decisions
EVIDENCE-CONSPIRACY-OTHER

CRIMES-REPUTATION-SEVER-

ANCE-CRIMINAL INTENT-INFORMATION-INSTRUCTIONS

MISDIRECTION-NONDIRECTION--Smaldone,

-

et al. vs. People of

the State of Colorado-No. 1423 1-Decided December 19, 1938
-District Court of Denver-Hon. Henry A. Hicks, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: The plaintiffs in error are three of the four defendants
in a criminal action instituted in the District Court of Denver. They
were found guilty by a jury on each of two counts in an information
charging an assault with intent to kill and murder, and a conspiracy
with one Stephens to kill and murder Leo Barnes.
On December 8, 1936, at about 7 P. M., Leo Barnes entered
his car and stepped on the starter. An explosion followed, shown by
expert evidence to have been produced by dynamite, which wrecked
the car and seriously injured Barnes. At the time, his car stood at the
curb on Grant Street in front of Barnes' apartment.
1. One who, as Stephens did, consents to participate
HELD:
in, and authorizes the initiation of, an illegal project and counsels
with those engaging in it, then demands a cut in the illicit gains, even
though he for a time remained quiescent in the project, cannot rightfully
object to the history of the enterprise being presented by the evidence,
even though it involved the commission of a crime by one or more of
those who are defendants with him, if the history of such enterprise
otherwise throws light on the motive he or his co-defendants might
have for committing another crime, and which constitutes a chain of
circumstances throwing. some light on the probability of their having
entered into a conspiracy with him to commit another crime in this
case to kill Barnes.
2. Evidence of reputation, a purely personal matter, admissible
against one defendant, but not against another, is not a ground for
severance where two or more are charged jointly.
3. Evidence of the motive of one defendant which is admissible
on the question of his criminal intent, which, like reputation is a purely
personal matter, should not entitle another defendant to a severance.
4. In a conspiracy case, or in case of a crime proceeding out of a
conspiracy, the several criminal intents of the participators are ingredients
of the crime of conspiracy and of the crime constituting its objective.
Hence, evidence admissible to prove the criminal intent, including the
motives of each individaul participant, is properly admissible against
all whether tried jointly or severally.
5.
"Experience has taught that in conspiracy cases an unusual
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latitude must be permitted in the admission of evidence and this rule is
almost universal."
6. "It is not necessary that an information should charge a conspiracy, but although no conspiracy is charged, if it is made to appear
that there was concerted action between co-defendants, the acts and
declaration of one are admissible against the other."
7. Error is assigned to the refusal of the court to give a tendered
instruction which informed the jury that a conviction on circumstantial
evidence alone was proper only when the circumstances relied upon were
consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis
of innocence. It would have been proper to give this instruction; however, the failure to give it amounted to nondirection merely and not
misdirection.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Bakke and Mr. Justice Knous concur. Mr. Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Bouck dissenting. Mr. Justice Holland not participating.
EN BANC.
CONTRACTS-PUBLIC BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTSSTATE HIGHWAY ENGINEER-BIDS-PREVAILING WAGE RATES

-Denver

Building and Construction Trades Council vs. Vail-

No. 14499-Decided December 30, 19.38-DistrictCourt of Den-

ver-Hon. Henry S. Lindsley, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS:
Denver Building and Construction Trades Council
sought injuction to restrain Vail, the State Highway Engineer from
opening certain highway construction bids on the ground that the
accurate prevailing rates of wages for the work required were not included in his published invitation for bids. The complaint stated that
the question should, under Chap. 124 of S. L. 1933 (1935 C.S.A. Chap.
97, Sec. 257), be referred to the Industrial Commission of Colorado
before the contracts are entered into, in order that the correct prevailing
rates of wages might be determined by that body.
The plaintiff in error is a voluntary association composed of 23
labor organizations, the membership of which consists of mechanics,
draftsmen, and skilled and unskilled laborers, who are engaged in the
building and construction industry. It and its constituent member
organizations were organized and function for the purpose of engaging
in collective bargaining with employers and contractors engaged in the
building and construction industry. The lower court sustained a demurrer to the complaint.
HELD:
1. The evident purpose of the statute requiring the
advertising for bids and the inclusion of prevailing rates in the notice
is to avoid the practical disadvantages, delays, and losses which the
public, the employers, and the employees naturally suffer by reason of
wage controversies that arise during the construction of highways and
other public works of the State.
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2. It is desirable to ascertain at the very outset the correct amount
of the rates nuestioned; and an opportunity for their early determination
by the Industrial Commission, as the ultimate and authentic fact finding
body, will tend to save unnecessary cost of time and money, and in
addition will supply a solid basis on which intending bidders can understandingly calculate their bids.
3. The Trades Council has a sufficient interest in the subject
matter to enable it to institute the proceedings in the case at bar.
4. Selection of the Industrial Commission as the fact-finding
body to determine the prevailing rates of wages under the act in question is entirely consonant with the commission's other duties.
5. A "dispute" has arisen in the correct sense of the word as used
by the statute and the Industrial Commission is vested with the power,
and charged with the duty of determining the actual prevailing wage
rates to be inserted in the invitation for bids.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Bakke dissent. Mr. Justice Holland not participating. EN
BANC.
MURDER-ABORTION-EVIDENCE-HEARSAY

RULE-DYING

DEC-

us. People-No. 14314Decided December 30, 1938-District Court of Denver-Hon.
Henry S. Lindsley, Judge-Reversed.
LARATIONS-RES

GESTAE-C/arh

FACTS:
Defendant convicted of murder in the second degree
for allegedly committing an abortion upon one, B. P., after she had
become pregnant by one, J. J. M.
HELD:
1. It constituted prejudicial error to admit testimony
of J. J. M. that a week before the date of the alleged operation, B. P.
told him "she was pregnant and was going to have an abortion performed by Dr. Clark." Being held out of the defendant's hearing and
prior to the time she first met or talked with him it was clearly hearsay
and came under no exception to the rule. It cannot be qualified as a
declaration of a co-conspirator.
2. Evidence of another doctor examined and found to be hearsay

and insufficient to connect up the defendant.
3. Evidence examined and found that death might have occurred
from subsequent medical attention.
4. Evidence found insufficient to specifically identify defendant
as one performing abortion.
5. Statements made by B. P. days after alleged operation are
not part of the res gestae.
6. Intention to have operation performed by defendant is not
proof that it was so performed by him.
7. Where there is no indication that the doctors had given up
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all hope for recovery, statements made by deceased are not dying
declarations.
8. Statements made to a doctor by way of history of her case are
admissible only insofar as they relate to the patient's symptoms and
condition and are not admissible on the question of responsibility for
an injury or physical condition.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Bakke dissent. EN BANC.
ESTATES-

CLAIMS

FOR FUNERAL

EXPENSES

-ADMINISTRATOR'S

FEES AND ATTORNEY FEES-In re: Estate of Cheney. Cheney, et
al. vs. Corbett, etc.-No. 14427-Decided December 19, 1938District Court of Lake County-Hon. William H. Luby, JudgeAffirmed.
HELD:
1. In the absence of a showing that the County Court
and the District Court abused their discretion in entering judgments of
$852.50 for funeral expenses, $1,084.99 for administrator's fees and
$1,084.99 for attorney's fees against estate of decedent, the appellate
court will not declare that they are unreasonable where the estate is
valued at $18,000.00.
2. Where the administrator's fees as fixed by the County and
District Courts are within the 6% fixed as a maximum by the statute
it will not be changed.
3. The statute as to fees for administrators has no application
to attorney fees, and this is another reason why the Supreme Court
will not question the reasonableness of the amount allowed for legal

services.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke dissents.
EN BANC.
APPOINTING AND REMOVING POWERS OF THE GOVERNOR AS TO MEMBERS OF THE HIGHWAY ADVISORY BOARD-People vs. Downing

-No.
14311--Decided December 27, 1938-District Court of
Denver-Hon. Otto Bock, Judge-Affirmed.
HELD:
1. The Governor of the State may remove from office
a member of the Highway Advisory Board without serving upon the
officer removed a notice of charges setting forth a cause for removal
and without holding a hearing before removing him.
2. The power of removal of such officer depends entirely upon
Section 100 of Chapter 143, 1935 C.S.A., as follows: "Members of
the board may be removed by the governor for cause."
3. Had the statute provided that members might be removed
by the Governor for one or more specified causes, the member would
probably have had the right to demand a hearing.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Justice Bakke and Mr. Justice Holland not participating. EN BANC.
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WILLS-CONSTRUCTION-ATTORNEY FEES-CLAIMS OF SECOND
CLASS-JURISDICTION-In re: Estate of Curtis. First National
Bank vs. Strickler, et at.-No. 14486-Deided December 27,
1938-DistrictCourt of El Paso County-Hon. John M. Meikle,
Judge-Affirmed.
HELD:
1. " 'As a general rule, where a testator has expressed
himself so ambiguously as to make it necessary or advisable to institute
an action or suit to obtain a construction of the will, it is proper to order
payment out of the estate, of the reasonable fees of attorneys of the
party instituting the action or suit.' " This rule can with propriety
be extended to include fees for services rendered at the instance of one
of 'the beneficiaries who responds to a citation that a hearing on the
proper construction of the will is to be had."
2.
Such expenses for attorney fees come within the second classification enumerated in Section 195, Chapter 176, 1935 C.S.A., the
original reading, "all expenses of proving the will *
*
*,
shall
compose the second class."
3.
Both county and district courts had jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the litigation.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Holland concur. IN DEPARTMENT.
SHAM PLEADINGS-GOOD FAITH--Greager vs. Kittleson---No. 14469
-Decided
December 19, 1938-District Court of Montrose
County-Hon. George W. Bruce, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Kittleson sued Greager on two promissory notes for $200
each, and had judgment after the trial court struck Greager's answer as
sham, and sustained a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
HELD:
"The only safe rule for Courts to adopt as a guide in
disposing of motions of this character, is not to strike out answers as
sham on the ground of falsity, unless the defendant * * * while denying its falsity in general terms, yet by his own showing demonstrates that
the denial is not in good faith, and that the answer is in fact false."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Holland concur. IN DEPARTMENT.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION--Golden, et al. vs. Sanderson, et al.No. 14408-Decided December 27, 1938-DistrictCourt of City
and County of Denver-Hon. Henry S. Lindsley, Judge-Reversed.
HELD:
1. Where claimant was engaged as helper to employer
who bought stacked hay from farmers and baled and marketed it, and
where there was no evidence that employer hired as many as four men,
industrial liability did not attach.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Bakke and Mr. Justice Holland concur.
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TAXATION--SALES TAX-TAX UPON RESALE OF TRADED-IN ARTI-

CLE-Homer F. Bedford, Treasurer of the State of Colorado vs.
Hartman Bros., et al.-No. 14437-Decided December 27, 1938
-District Court of Denver-Hon. Henry S. Lindsley, JudgeReversed.
FACTS: Defendant accepted in part payment a used car, and collected 2% sales tax on full purchase price of new car. He later sold the
used car to C. Ray Bass and State Treasurer seeks to enforce the collection of the 2% tax on this sale also.
HELD: 1. "There is no limit to the number of times a particular
article of merchandise may be subject to a sales tax so long as it remains
in the stream of commerce and goes through the regular channels of trade
and the dealer must collect the tax, unless the property falls within the
exemptions."
2. The tax is not imposed on the dealer, nor is the buyer subjected
to double taxation. The dealer is merely the state's agent to collect and
is compensated for that service.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Holland concur. IN DEPARTMENT.

vs. Ellis-No. 14140-Decided December 27, 1938-Final order reinstating respondent.

DISBARMENT-REINSTATEMENT-People

FACTS: Previously respondent had been suspended from the bar
until further order.
HELD: The court having examined the record submitted by respondent, and having procured and read a transcript of the testimony
given by respondent and his co-defendants at the District Court trial
on charges of a misdemeanor--eavesdropping-and having noted his
conviction, and having noted the period of his suspension, orders his
reinstatement effective on announcement.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke specially
concurring. Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice Holland concur in the
conclusion.

EN BANC.

QUIET TITLE-BOUNDARIES-MONUMENTS--Clark, et al. vs. Pueblo

Quarries, Inc.-No. 14421-Decided January 9, 1939-District
Court of Pueblo-Hon. W. B. Stewart, Judge-Reversed.

HELD: 1. The conformity of the boundaries of a placer claim
with the lines of the United States Government survey, by description of
a placer location as covering recognized units or subdivisions of such
survey, is sufficient to satisfy both the Federal and state statutes requiring
the tieing of the claim to natural objects or permanent monuments.
2. A description of a placer claim by quarter-sections, sections,
township and range is a sufficient description upon which to rely for
ownership.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Justice Holland not participating. EN BANC.
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